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Abstract
Background: Models of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) transmission have assumed a
homogeneous landscape across which Euclidean distance is a suitable measure of the spatial
dependency of transmission. This paper investigated features of the landscape and their impact on
transmission during the period of predominantly local spread which followed the implementation
of the national movement ban during the 2001 UK FMD epidemic. In this study 113 farms diagnosed
with FMD which had a known source of infection within 3 km (cases) were matched to 188 control
farms which were either uninfected or infected at a later timepoint. Cases were matched to controls
by Euclidean distance to the source of infection and farm size. Intervening geographical features and
connectivity between the source of infection and case and controls were compared.
Results: Road distance between holdings, access to holdings, presence of forest, elevation change
between holdings and the presence of intervening roads had no impact on the risk of local FMD
transmission (p > 0.2). However the presence of linear features in the form of rivers and railways
acted as barriers to FMD transmission (odds ratio = 0.507, 95% CIs = 0.297,0.887, p = 0.018).
Conclusion: This paper demonstrated that although FMD spread can generally be modelled using
Euclidean distance and numbers of animals on susceptible holdings, the presence of rivers and
railways has an additional protective effect reducing the probability of transmission between
holdings.
Background
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is a highly infectious viral
disease of cloven hoofed animals. The outbreak that
occurred in the UK between February and September
2001 resulted in 2026 Infected Premises (IPs) on the Brit-
ish mainland. An estimated 4.2 million animals were
slaughtered for disease control purposes and another 2.5
million for welfare purposes [1]. The estimated direct and
indirect costs of the epidemic were £6 billion [2].
The FMD virus can be transmitted through a variety of
routes including aerosol transmission, direct contact
between animals and on fomites, furthermore, the virus
has been shown to spread over distances greater than 100
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UK epidemic long range transmission events were facili-
tated by the movements of infected animals; this was
largely brought to an end by the imposition of the
national movement ban (NMB) on susceptible animals
introduced on the 23rd February. From this date, disease
transmission was more localised with over 50% of trans-
mission events occurring across distances of less than 3
km and more than 80% over distances of less than 10 km
[4-6]. Some mathematical models of FMD transmission
[6-8] incorporate this distance decay effect in the form of
a kernel which describes the declining probability of
infection with distance from an infectious source. This
kernel assumes that the landscape is homogeneous and
that elements of the landscape such as roads, rivers and
topography have no influence on the likelihood of virus
transmission. Furthermore, the kernel assumes that the
distance between two holdings can be adequately mod-
elled as straight line Euclidean distance rather than road
distance or topographically adjusted Euclidean distance.
Savill et al [9] tested the utility of Euclidean distance com-
pared to road distance between holding pairs at a coarse
scale. The authors calculated Euclidean distances and road
distances between an IP and a potential 'daughter IP' and
between IPs and susceptible non-IPs over distances of up
to 10 km. They found no statistically significant difference
in the correlations for road to Euclidean distance between
the two groups of holdings where they were not separated
by river estuaries. However, where pairs of holdings were
separated by a river estuary (in this case the Severn estuary
and Solway Firth) there was a significant difference. This
is because road travel across estuaries is limited by the
availability of crossing points, so road distance is gener-
ally greater when farms were separated by an estuary com-
pared to instances in which they are not. In these instances
road distance becomes a more appropriate measure of
transmission risk. However, the analysis of Savill et al [9]
considered all possible infection events within 10 km, as
opposed to having used transmission tracing data gath-
ered through epidemiological investigations during the
epidemic. Therefore the effects of road distance on trans-
mission may have been masked by the nature of the IP
pairings being used.
The current paper will extend the work of Savill et al [9] by
investigating the potential for geographical features to act
as conduits or barriers to infection during the period of
local spread following the NMB. The analysis will be con-
ducted at a more localised scale and at a far greater preci-
sion by analysing only known infection events and by
looking at a greater range of geographical features. This
will be accomplished by considering distance matched
source-case-control groups where the source was believed to
have infected the case but did not infect the control. The
geographical features separating source-case and source-con-
trol pairings will then be compared.
Results and discussion
In the univariate analysis most predictor variables were
not associated with differences between cases and controls
at the p < 0.2 level, the exceptions were rivers and railways
and road distance for which p = 0.088, 0.166 and 0.098
respectively (Table 1). Numbers in the present groups for
both rivers and railways were relatively small (61 and 27
respectively, Table 2). These features prevent transmission
by forming linear barriers which inhibit movements of
humans and animals across them, features described by
Smith et al [10] as semipermeable barriers. Therefore, the
rivers and railways categories were merged to form a single
barriers variable and this was statistically significant at the
p < 0.05 level (p = 0.018), with the number of cases sepa-
rated by a barrier significantly lower than the number of
controls (Table 3). The odds ratio of there being a barrier
between source and case/control holding were 0.5 as high
for cases than for controls (odds ratio = 0.507, 95% CI =
0.297, 0.887).
In addition to controlling for Euclidean distance, animal
numbers and indirectly (by capping the distance at 3 km)
for Disease Control Centre (DCC) in the group selection
process these risk factors were further checked by inserting
each of these terms into the model as a covariate. The
insertion of these terms did not affect the significance of
the barriers term, however the insertion of the Euclidean
distance term did alter the p-value of the road distance
term such that with the Euclidean distance term the p-
value of the road distance term is greater than 0.5.
The presence of linear features in the form of rivers or rail-
ways is the only geographical influence on FMD transmis-
sion which could be detected using this methodology. The
Table 1: Univariate generalised linear mixed model (binomial 
errors) analysis of predictor variables.
Variable Unit odds ratio (95% CIs) t-value p
Road distance km 1.507 (0.93,2.44) 1.66 0.098
Rivers Absent 1 - -
Present 0.594 (0.33, 1.08) -1.72 0.087
Rail Absent 1 - -
Present 0.550 (0.24, 1.28) -1.389 0.166
Forest Absent 1 - -
Present 1.286 (0.69, 2.40) 0.790 0.431
Road 0 1 - -
1 0.959 (0.46, 2.02) -1.109 0.913
2 & 3 0.737 (0.33, 1.67) -0.732 0.465
Access 1 1 - -
2 1.17 (0.72,1.90) 0.614 0.540
3 0.951 (0.41,2.19) -0.118 0.906
Elevation change 0.965 (0.92, 1.01) -1.448 0.149mPage 2 of 7
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transmission would be by the prevention of the move-
ments of animals, people and vehicles. Two farms sepa-
rated by a small river may be less likely to have contacts,
exchange personnel and have animals coming into con-
tact compared to two farms separated by a fence or open
farmland. A similar effect has been observed in rabies
transmission, in which the presence of rivers were found
to reduce the rate of progression of waves of rabies to one
seventh of its speed before the river [10].
Although rivers and railways together were a statistically
significant barrier to FMD transmission, roads were not a
statistically significant barrier to transmission (Table 1).
This supports previous studies [9] which demonstrated
that even a major road such at the M6 motorway did not
act as a barrier to FMD transmission. This may be a result
of roads forming a more permeable barrier than rivers and
railways. A set of 325 cases and 766 controls which had not
been controlled for animal numbers was analysed using a
generalised linear model with binomial error term to eval-
uate any differences in terms of numbers of animals on
cases and controls (Table 4). Numbers of both cattle and
sheep were statistically significantly lower on controls
compared to cases irrespective of data source used (see
methods). This supports previous findings that showed
that IPs were larger farms [6] and also justified the criteria
of selecting controls on animal numbers.
These detailed analyses of geographical influences on
virus transmission were made possible by the highly
detailed FMD datasets. The identification of source-case
pairings was based upon the identification of putative
sources of infection for IPs during the epidemic. These
sources were identified through epidemiological investi-
gations; data which have been used in previous studies
[6,11]. However for many IPs the source could not be
identified with certainty. Analysis of these data identified
386 inconsistencies in source identification based upon
dates of infection and slaughter. Although these IPs were
excluded, there is no simple way to detect any remaining
errors. Since the epidemic it has been demonstrated that
sources of infection can be established with a high degree
of certainty using FMDV sequence data [12], however,
these techniques have only been applied to 22 IPs from
2001 and therefore are of little value for this study.
Conclusion
Amongst the mainly geographical risk factors studied
here, Euclidean distance and the number of animals on
the susceptible holding appeared to be the most impor-
tant determinant of risk of FMD transmission, a conclu-
sion supported by previous analysis [6,9]. Beyond this it
is difficult to draw further distinctions between holdings
in terms of their relative susceptibilities based on these
analyses. Despite the fact that some infectious contacts
will be facilitated by the road network, road distance has
again been shown not to be a more accurate predictor of
transmission risk than simple Euclidean distance. How-
ever, this paper has demonstrated that these infectious
contacts can be reduced by the presence of linear barriers
in the form of rivers and railways but not roads, possibly
because roads are too permeable to contacts across them.
While the analysis was conducted on a small subset of 113
IPs (5.8% of the IPs infected after the NMB), the size of
the subset was the result of the rigorous group selection
procedure. These IPs were compared to all IPs infected
after the NMB to ensure that they were a representative
sample and although almost significantly different in
terms of species composition and spatial distribution the
cases were a representative subset of all other IPs. In con-
clusion, the presence of rivers and railways should be
incorporated into spatial models of FMD transmission to
give more accurate estimates of transmission risk.
Methods
The study used a case-control methodology in which case
and control selection was based upon their geographical
relationship to a source IP. The process of matching controls
to cases and sources is described below.
Premises data
Sources and cases were selected from the 2026 Infected
Premises (IPs). Data on IPs are stored in the DEFRA Dis-
ease Control System (DCS) database [13]. This dataset
included a coordinate for the main farm building, num-
bers of animals culled on the holding, estimated date of
Table 2: Number of instances of holdings being separated by 
rivers and railways.
Absent Present
River Case 94 (83.2) 16 (14.2)
Control 141 (74.6) 45 (23.8)
Rail Case 105 (92.9) 7 (6.2)
Control 166 (87.8) 20 (10.6)
River & Rail Case 91 (80.5) 22 (19.5)
Control 128 (67.7) 61 (32.3)
Percentages based upon the row totals are in brackets.
Table 3: Multivariate generalised linear mixed model (binomial 
error term) of barriers as a risk factor for risk of FMD 
transmission.
Predictor Unit odds ratio (95% CIs) t-value p-value
Intercept - -2.480 0.014
Barriers No 1 - -
Yes 0.507 (0.297,0.887) -2.382 0.018Page 3 of 7
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tered and the most likely source of infection for many IPs.
The coordinates recorded in the DCS were the coordinates
of the main farm building as this has been identified as
the best location from which to georeference farm hold-
ings [14]. However, in the DCS, instances in which the
infected animals are more than 1 km from the main hold-
ing were georeferenced to the location of the affected
stock [13].
IPs were considered as potential cases if they were:
1. Estimated to have been infected after the NMB. This is
because before the NMB was imposed there were a greater
range of mechanisms of spread of FMD operating.
2. The IP had a reliable source of infection identified. A
source of infection was considered reliable if the daughter
IPs' livestock was infected after the source IP was infected
but before the source IP was slaughtered.
3. The IP had a source of infection within 3 km.
Controls were selected from the 139,195 holdings regis-
tered on the June 2000 agricultural censuses of England,
Scotland and Wales. There was no census conducted in
2001, so the June 2000 census was the most appropriate
dataset for these analyses and has been used extensively in
analysis of the 2001 FMD epidemic [4,7,15]. Data in the
agricultural census includes a coordinate for the main
farm building and animal numbers by species.
A holding was included as a potential control if it:
1. Had no off-fields. Holdings with off-fields were identi-
fied using the holding number of the parcel of land and
the name of the owner (data not shown). The number of
animals on the off-fields can not be known with certainty
and therefore only holdings without off-fields were
included in these analyses.
2. Was within 4 km of an IP. A distance of 4 km was used
as this allowed a window either side of the 3 km defini-
tion of local spread.
Identifying groups
Potential controls were matched to a case-source pair based
on the Euclidean distance from source to potential control
(dn) and the distance from source to case (dc). Groups were
matched where:
-250m <dn - dc < 199.5m (1)
Asymmetric bounds were used to equalise the area either
side of dc, thus ensuring that similar numbers of controls
were selected on either side of dc.
Controls which were culled at a later point in the epidemic
were included if the animals on the premises were slaugh-
tered more than 14 days after the source was slaughtered.
This allows for the maximum incubation time [16,17]
removing the possibility that the control had been infected
by the source. Furthermore, if the potential control was an
IP it must have been infected at least 14 days after the
source was slaughtered to allow for error in the estimated
infection date of the potential control.
It has previously been shown [6] that animal numbers on
the premises are a risk factor for susceptibility. Therefore
groups were evaluated to look for differences between case
and control(s) in terms of animal numbers (Figure 1). As a
consequence of differences in the definition of a farm
premises described above and the time of year at which
the data were gathered, animal numbers on the agricul-
tural census and DCS may have differed for an individual
holding. Therefore, animal numbers on case and control(s)
were compared using two methods depending upon data
availability:
1. For the cases for which there is census data, the census
numbers on the case were compared to the census num-
bers on the control.
2. Animal numbers from the DCS were compared to ani-
mal numbers on the census for all case-control pairs.
To ensure that the number of animals was controlled for,
the numbers of animals on the control had to be similar to
those on the case as defined by the following criteria:
Table 4: Univariate generalised linear model (binomial error term) analysis of animal numbers by species on preliminary cases 
compared to controls.
Species Case data (n) Control data (n) Estimate SE χ2 p
Cattle (100s) DCS (325) Census (766) -0.561 0.061 98.59 <0.001
Cattle (100s) Census (218) Census (766) -0.626 0.080 63.34 <0.001
Sheep (1000s) DCS (325) Census (766) -0.998 0.153 46.7 <0.001
Sheep (1000s) Census (218) Census (766) -0.762 0.161 21.24 <0.001Page 4 of 7
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sheep and pigs on the case.
2. The control had no more than 50 fewer cattle than the
case and no more than 100 fewer sheep and pigs than the
case.
3. The control must have held cattle if the case held cattle.
The latter criterion made allowances for relatively small
holdings, for instance it allowed a case with 50 head of cat-
tle to be paired with a control with 30 head.
Comparisons of numbers of cattle (A) and sheep (B) on cases, sources and controls broken down by census animal numbers (ii) and DCS animal (i)Figure 1
Comparisons of numbers of cattle (A) and sheep (B) on cases, sources and controls broken down by census ani-
mal numbers (ii) and DCS animal numbers (i). Whiskers represent 1.5 times the standard deviation and the y-axes are 
square-root transformed.
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In these instances the controls was assigned to just one case;
if one of the cases had more than one control the control
was removed from that group, otherwise one of the
groups was selected at random. The resulting dataset com-
prised 113 groups which were composed of 113 cases and
188 controls. The selection criteria which generated these
data are summarised as:
1. The control if culled was culled more than 14 days after
the case.
2. The control if an IP was infected more than 14 days after
the case.
3. Groups which meet the distance matching criteria
described above.
4. Matching for animal numbers as described above.
5. Ensuring that a control was matched to only one case.
The 113 cases were checked for representativeness by com-
paring the cases to all other IPs infected after the NMB. The
cases were not statistically significantly different from the
IPs in terms of species composition described by whether
the holding was cattle only, sheep only or mixed (  =
5.59 p = 0.061), temporal distribution (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test based upon estimated dates of infection p =
0.126) and spatial distribution based upon Disease Con-
trol Centre (Fishers Exact Test p = 0.057). Therefore the
identified cases appeared to be a valid representation of
the IP set.
Predictors
Road distance was calculated between two points by over-
laying the data onto scanned Ordnance Survey 1:50,000
scale topographic maps supplied by the EDiNA Digimap
service [18] and calculating the shortest distance along
roads using the measure tool in ESRI ArcGIS 9. Interven-
ing rivers and railways and forest were derived from the
same maps in turn by taking a straight line between two
points and evaluating intervening features by presence or
absence of the features. Intervening roads were measured
on the following scale:
0 = no intervening road.
1 = Minor road only.
2 = B, A road or motorway.
Accessibility was derived from the locations of cases and
controls on the maps on the following scale:
1 = Track or dead end road.
2 = Beside a minor road
3 = Beside a main road.
Cumulative elevation change between two holdings was
derived from an OS 1:50,000 Digital Elevation Model
supplied by EDiNA [18] after tiles for the necessary
regions were mosaiced in ArcGIS 9.0. Straight lines
between the points were generated in ESRI ArcView 3.2
and cumulative elevation change along the lines calcu-
lated using the surface tools extension in ArcView 3.2 [19].
Statistical analysis
The outcome for each holding (whether it was a case or
control) formed a binary outcome variable with the control
category the reference level. The effect of having multiple
distance matched controls for each case was handled by
classifying each case and all its controls as a group. The
group was added to the logistic regression model as a ran-
dom effect to form a mixed effects logistic regression
model in which variables were considered statistically sig-
nificant when p < 0.05. This was implemented in the
MASS Package [20] for the R statistical environment [21].
Interrelationships between univariate predictors which
were significant at p < 0.2 were analysed in a multivariate
model. Significance of the predictors was evaluated using
the Wald statistic and the logits of continuous variables
were inspected for linearity. The effectiveness of the selec-
tion process was checked by inserting Euclidean distance
(source to case), animal numbers by species on the holding
and DCC into the model. Any major change to the signif-
icance of predictor would suggest that a factor had not
been adequately controlled for and could bias the results.
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